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Judicial Quality and the Supreme Court Nominating Process 
by 
Andrew O’Geen 
Under the Direction of Robert M. Howard 
ABSTRACT 
In recent months, presidential appointments to the Supreme Court have become an 
increasingly salient issue with both the public and the press.  The relevance of the topic makes it 
an inviting subject for political science research.  When looking at the question of judicial 
quality, the problem that researchers have faced in the past is one of quantifying quality.  This 
work seeks to expand on previous survey research done on the quality of individual justices.  By 
using quality scores (Comiskey 2004) as a dependent variable, it is possible to analyze influences 
on the President’s nomination choice and their relative impacts on the quality of justices.  By 
using a more rigorous approach, this study can more confidently make assertions about the 
nature of the nomination and confirmation process and the quality of Supreme Court justices.   
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Introduction 
Article II § 2 of the United States Constitution confers upon the president the power, with 
the “advice and consent of the Senate” to appoint justices to the Supreme Court.  For each 
president, beginning with Washington, much thought and consideration went into the formation 
of the federal judiciary (Goldman 1997; Slotnick 1984) and any future president would be loath 
to miss the opportunity to influence the nature of the judiciary during his term(s) in office.  
Nowhere is this more evident than in the selection of a potential Supreme Court justice.  While 
nominations for federal judgeships at the district and appellate levels are much more common, 
the nomination of a potential Supreme Court Justice holds special interest not just for scholars 
but for the public as well. 
While Supreme Court nominations are both important and interesting, some scholars 
have argued that the process by which nominees are selected and confirmed is broken.  The 
argument is that the increased involvement of the public, in the form of the media and various 
interest groups, has altered the process from its original state as political bargaining between the 
president and the senate(Carter 1994; Davis 2005).  This involvement has created a spectacle of 
the nominations and caused presidents to adjust their nominees to account for public perception 
as well as the Senate’s interpretation of public perception.  The results are nominees without 
substantial track records on substantive and divisive issues.  This lack of experience can also lead 
to a lack in qualifications for the position (Schultz 2003).  Supreme Court nominees are 
increasingly silent on topics that hold the interest of many in the public and their performances in 
the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee are judged not on the content of their 
answers but more on their appearance and ability to answer questions without saying anything 
outrageous. 
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The question at the heart of this research is whether the circumstances surrounding a 
nomination, in particular the influences on the President, affect the quality of those who are 
eventually confirmed to the Supreme Court.  Are there systemic factors within the process that 
influence the quality of nominees?  Does the changing nature of the process affect the quality of 
those who have been confirmed recently?  These are a few of the questions that this paper 
addresses using a numerical measure of judicial quality as the dependent variable. 
This work differs substantially from other studies of judicial quality in several ways.  
First is the focus on the nomination process and the political environment in which a justice is 
nominated.  Epstein and Segal (2005) look at this process, but with an eye toward the likelihood 
of confirmation rather that the quality of the justice’s service on the Court.  By focusing on the 
ultimate outcome (the quality of a given justices’ service), it becomes possible for this work to 
make statements about the effectiveness of the process.  Second, this paper moves the study of 
judicial quality on the Supreme Court from a descriptive phase into an explanatory phase.  One 
may assume that a president would simply choose the most qualified candidate for a seat on the 
Supreme Court.  Given the pool of available candidates, it does not seem feasible that a president 
could not find a person that would live up to the expectations that both the government and the 
public have for a Supreme Court Justice.  However, as the variation in quality shows, this is not 
always the case.  By looking at the circumstances surrounding a nomination and the effects that 
those circumstances have on the ultimate product, this work provides a step in the process of 
explaining the variation in quality on the Court. 
The literature on judicial selection abounds with studies, both historical and theoretical, 
on the nature and evolution of the process (Abraham 1999; Davis 2005; Felice and Weisberg 
1988-89; Gates and Cohen 1989; Scigliano 1971; Segal 1987; Silverstein 1994; Watson and 
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Stookey 1995; Yalof 1999).  One salient feature of these and other studies to this work is the 
increasingly political look of the selection process.  The influences of outside forces such as 
public scrutiny, the media, and powerful interest groups have shaped the process into something 
more resembling an election campaign than the collegial tone that was the hallmark of the 
process for so long (Davis 2005; Johnson and Roberts 2004).  A direct result of the influences of 
these outside forces is pressure on the President and his advisors to satisfy those other than the 
Senate in the nomination of a Supreme Court Justice.  The President must balance his own 
interests with those of the Senate, the public, the media, and any concerned interest groups 
(Goldman and Slotnick 1999; Yalof 1999). 
Supreme Court Appointments 
The salience of Supreme Court nominations makes them an attractive subject for political 
scientists and legal scholars.    University law libraries are full of works devoted not only to the 
high court as a whole but to individual justices and their confirmation hearings, opinions and 
personal and professional lives.  The nomination process in particular holds a great deal of 
significance.  For many in the general public, the early stages of the nomination and 
confirmation process represent their first (and likely their most protracted) look at the nominee.  
In this forum, the public can witness the poise and intelligence of a candidate for the Court, as 
well as get a glimpse of the nominee’s legal views and reasoning.  Also, for the members of the 
Senate Judiciary committee, it is a chance to question the nominee on their legal philosophy and 
gain a greater understanding of their positions on important Constitutional issues. 
Two major factors are the driving forces behind the salience of Supreme Court 
appointments.  The first is the independence of the Court, which manifests itself most readily in 
the form of the life tenure of the justices.  Also, justices are now serving much longer, on 
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average, than their predecessors.  In the last thirty-five years, the average length of service for a 
given justice has steadily risen (from 1970, an increase on average from 14.9 years to 25.6 
years).  Second is the increasingly political nature of the nomination and confirmation process 
(Carter 1994; Comiskey 2004; Peretti 1999; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Silverstein 1994).  With the 
election of Ronald Reagan came an increased emphasis on the political views and affiliations of 
judges.  Reagan’s long-view strategy of judicial appointment was meant to shape the federal 
bench for years to come.  A direct result of Reagan’s attempts to mold the judiciary in a 
conservative image was a backlash of the norm of concession in the Senate in the form of the 
failed confirmation of Robert Bork (Silverstein 1994).  The combination of the change in tone of 
the process and the recent explosion of media availability have led the Senate to be much more 
willing and able to investigate the qualifications and personal ideologies of nominees and 
challenge the President (Comiskey 2004). 
Another factor affecting nominations to the Court is the increased involvement of both 
the public and powerful interest groups.  Studies have shown that both interest group activity and 
constituency concerns can be factors in the success or failure of a nominee (Caldeira and Wright 
1998; Overby et al. 1992).     
With increased public awareness of the Court and the confirmation process comes 
increased scrutiny on the practices of the institution.  There are those who argue that the quality 
of Justices on the Court has declined over time and thus the overall quality of the Court has 
declined (Fein 1991; Schultz 2003; Silverstein 1994).  The problem of measuring the quality of 
past Justices and of past Courts is a formidable one for researchers.  Attempts to operationalize 
such a subjective notion as quality may be subject to the coding whims of the researcher.  
Therefore scholars have utilized surveys to understand the variation in quality among individual 
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Justices and the Court as a whole.  Surveys, while admittedly subjective, avail the researcher to 
the expertise of the respondents and can provide a useful tool in the study of the Court.  Previous 
research has utilized elite surveys to find workable measures of difficult variables (Segal, 
Timpone, and Howard 2000).  These studies show that elite surveys, while admittedly not an 
ideal method, can provide reliable measures of variables that have previously been difficult to 
quantify. 
Judicial Quality 
  Previous work on judicial quality lacks the in-depth statistical treatment that is the 
hallmark of most present research in public law.  With the exception of recent work by Epstein 
and Segal (2005), studies including measures of judicial quality have utilized ordinal scales to 
operationalize their dependent variable.  This work seeks to expand the function of previous 
survey research done on the quality of individual Justices.  By using ordinal quality scores 
(Comiskey 2004) as a dependent variable, it becomes possible to analyze potential influencing 
factors and their relative impacts on the nomination and confirmation process and ultimately on 
the Court; and also to observe any bias that may exist in the scores themselves.  This allows for 
not only a systematic review of quality on the Court but also suggestions for future research on 
judicial quality.      
Several studies have been published that seek to rank past Justices in terms of their 
“greatness” (Asch 1971; Bradley 1993).  These studies were the result of surveys presented to 
scholars and students of the Court in an attempt to classify those who have served on the Court in 
terms of their quality.  The problem faced by scholars in applying this information to a 
substantive study of quality on the Court is that the format of the survey only asked respondents 
to list justices from greatest to least or to classify them in one of five categories of “greatness”.  
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For scholars to perform any type of advanced statistical analysis of the quality of Justices and the 
Court, it would be necessary to quantify quality.       
This task was undertaken by Michael Comiskey (2004).  Comiskey conducted a survey of 
law professors and political science professors.  The survey asked respondents to rank past and 
present Justices on a scale from 0-4 (4 being the highest quality) and to then provide a brief 
explanation of their ranking.  Comiskey then took the mean of the responses to come up with a 
score for each justice on the Court from Holmes through Breyer.  Using the results of his survey, 
Comiskey then proceeded to address the question of whether the quality of justices (and by 
default, the Court) has declined over time.  He found that the average quality of justices has 
remained fairly stable over time.  This is a result of the relatively even distribution of weaker and 
higher quality justices throughout the span of his research. 
Comiskey’s results prompted the principal research question in this work.  If, as 
Comiskey’s and other’s research has shown, there is variation in the quality of Justices who 
serve on the Court, what factors may play into this variation?  Are there forces at work that may 
influence the placement of a high or low quality justice?  Finally, does the political conflict that 
exists in the form of ideological differences and the President’s power vis-à-vis Congress 
influence the quality of the justice confirmed?   Using the results of Comiskey’s survey, it 
becomes possible to perform statistical analysis to determine the effects of political 
circumstances on the quality of the nominee.  Specifically, what circumstances influence the 
President’s nomination of a high or low quality Justice? 
Ideology 
As the public’s view of the Court and the nomination process becomes increasingly 
political, the circumstances surrounding the nomination of a potential Justice become more 
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important to both political scientists and those directly involved in the process.  Research has 
shown that judicial decision making can be predicted accurately by observing the political 
proclivities of a given justice (Segal and Spaeth 2002).  Working from this conclusion it is easy 
to see the importance of political preferences when a vacancy on the Court is to be filled. 
The degree to which ideology influences Supreme Court voting is a topic of debate 
among social scientists (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Vanberg 2001).  However, the fact that ideology 
plays a role in determining justices voting behavior is taken as a given.  While professional and 
legal credentials and qualifications are clearly necessary for the confirmation of most serious 
nominees to the Court, increasingly the nomination and confirmation of a potential Supreme 
Court Justice hinges on a question of personal and professional ideology1.  If one is to consider 
the political ideology of Justices as important in decision making, it follows that their ideology 
will be a factor in the decision of a president to nominate them to the Court in the first place 
(Epstein and Segal 2005; Segal, Timpone, and Howard 2000).   
Studies have also shown that the relative ideological position of Senators and Presidents 
are important in the outcome of roll call votes (Krehbiel 1998).  Viewing the confirmation vote 
for a potential Justice in terms of the roll call vote helps to see the importance of the ideological 
positioning of both the president and the “pivotal” Senators.  Using common-space ideological 
score developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1984), the ideological difference between the Senate 
and the President can be assessed at any given time.  Common space scores represent a static 
ideological score for the entire tenure of a public official and are comparable across institutions2.  
                                                 
1
 The failed nomination of Robert Bork is an excellent example.  Also, the more recent failed nomination of Harriett 
Myers provides insight into the importance of ideology in the selection process. 
2
 There are no common-space scores available for presidents Truman and Roosevelt.  For Truman, his score from 
his time in the Senate is used as the common-space scores represent static ideology over time (see Sala & Spriggs 
2004).  For Roosevelt, the score becomes trickier.  In a conference version of the same paper, Sala & Spriggs 
devised a method for computing Roosevelt’s ideology in the common space.  To obtain a common-space score, the 
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With this information it is possible to understand the impact of ideological differences on the 
nomination process. Also, previous work on the nomination and confirmation of federal judges 
has shown that similarly measured ideological distance significantly impacts the duration of the 
confirmation process for both lower federal judges (Binder and Maltzman 2002) and Supreme 
Court justices (Shipan and Shannon 2003).    Finally, common space scores for Supreme Court 
Justices, developed by Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland (2005), provide an added level of 
analysis to the ideology question.  These scores allow for testing of any bias in the dependent 
variable in terms of judicial ideology.  The understood importance of ideology in both judicial 
decision making and the interaction between Congress and the President yields the first 
hypothesis to be tested: 
H1: A President will nominate a higher quality Justice when his ideology is more distant 
from the Senate median. 
Presidential Popularity 
Conventional wisdom holds that the nomination and confirmation process for Supreme 
Court Justices is marked by significant political maneuvering by both the President and members 
of the Senate (Goldman and Slotnick 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2004; Moraski and Shipan 
1999; Segal 1987; Silverstein 1994; Yalof 1999).  For political scientists, questions arise as to 
the importance of different factors in the nomination and confirmation process.  Does the 
President make certain choices based on his popularity or the public perception of the judiciary?  
Do the Senators in the judiciary committee possess the political capital to block the confirmation 
vote or kill the nomination in committee?  
                                                                                                                                                             
scores existing in the data are regressed on the measures of Presidential liberalism developed by Segal, Timpone, 
and Howard (2000).  The resulting equation is then used to calculate the common-space score for Roosevelt. 
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Research has shown that presidential popularity can be directly linked to legislative 
success (Ostrom and Simon 1985).  If legislative success is taken to imply any successful 
interaction between the President and Congress, the importance of presidential popularity on the 
nomination and confirmation processes becomes evident.   Also, Presidents are more readily 
seeking the approval and support of the public for potential justices (Johnson and Roberts 2004).  
If a president is unable, because of a lower level of popularity, to rally the public around his 
nominee, he is more likely to nominate someone whose quality and qualifications can more 
easily withstand the political scrutiny of the process.   
Finally, the President must overcome the final hurdle in the confirmation process.  Under 
the Constitution, the Senate has the authority to provide advice and consent to the President with 
regard to his nominations.  In the nomination of a potential justice the President must take into 
account not only his own political and personal goals, but those of the Senate as well (Epstein 
and Segal 2005).  Politics, both partisan and institutional plays an enormous role in the interplay 
between the President and the Senate when it comes to Supreme Court nominations(Moraski and 
Shipan 1999; Segal 1987; Segal and Spaeth 2002). 
Given the importance of the President’s political position with respect to both the public 
and Congress, the second hypothesis tested is as follows:   
H2: A President with lower popularity will nominate a higher quality justice.  
Data and Methods 
 The above two hypotheses will be tested using a standard OLS regression model.  While 
at first glance the dependent variable, mean quality score, may seem bounded thus warranting a 
logit or probit regression model, this is not necessarily the case.  In the presentation of his results, 
Comiskey reports mean averages at two decimal places.  Thus, even though the survey limits the 
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results of the quality rankings to five possible answers, the mean averages allow for four hundred 
possibilities.  For this reason, an OLS regression is the most appropriate method for conducting 
this particular analysis. 
 Data for the various independent variables was collected from a variety of sources.  Data 
was collected for each justice beginning with Justice Reed in 1938 and includes each subsequent 
sitting justice through Justice Breyer3.   While there have been two recent appointments to the 
Court, the data for the dependent variable does not include quality scores for Justices Roberts 
and Alito.  The descriptive statistics for the relevant variables are reported in Table 1.   
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable        Observations     Mean          Std. Dev.           Min Max 
 
Quality           32                      2.48          .6469429            1.11  3.56 
Ideological Distance         32                        .47          .1881903 .122  .722 
Presidential Popularity           32                    61.46          11.12407             44.5          87 
Length of Service         32                     17.59           9.411247      2     37 
Judicial Ideology                    29       .000897         .3466267           -.751   .584 
 
Two variations of the same model are presented in this paper.  The first includes variables for the 
ideological distance between the President and the Senate median4, the president’s popularity 
rating at the time of the nomination5, and the length in years of service on the Court. The control 
for length of service is necessary to control for the likelihood that longer serving justices will 
receive higher quality scores because of their increased exposure and familiarity to respondents.  
                                                 
3
 The selection of justices for the data set has several justifications.  The first consideration is the scope of the 
project.  Limiting the justices studied to those appointed by Roosevelt and later allows for a much more manageable 
data set.  Second, data are not available for presidential popularity prior to the Roosevelt administration.  Finally, 
Justice Black is excluded on the front end of the data because he was nominated and confirmed during the 74th 
Congress.  The variable measuring ideological distance between the President and the Senate median utilizes 
common-space ideology scores and these are only available from the 75th Congress to the present. 
4
 Ideological distance is measured in terms of the absolute value of the difference between the nominating 
president’s first dimension common-space score and that of the Senate median.  First dimension common space 
scores measure economic conservatism and range from -1 to 1.     
5
 This variable is measured using the results of the most recent Gallup poll prior to the nomination. 
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A second model is then presented which includes a variable for the ideology of the 
justice.  The control for judicial ideology is included in the form of common-space scores for the 
ideology of the nominated justice.  The scores were developed by Epstein, Martin, Segal, and 
Westerland (2005) and reflect the first dimension ideology of the justices compatible with the 
first dimension common-space scores developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1984)6 for presidents 
and those in Congress. 
 The control for ideology is necessary to offset bias that may exist in the observations for 
the dependent variable in two forms.  First, the personal political beliefs of the respondents to the 
survey may have crept into the responses.  Including the ideology of the justice in the model 
assures that the changes in the dependent variable are driven by the independent variables alone 
and not the personal biases of the respondents.  Second is the issue of timing.  In recent years, by 
all appreciable measures, the make-up of the Court has moved in a conservative direction.  Those 
justices identified as liberal tend to be those who served on the court during or before the Burger 
Court.  This being said, respondents to the survey had the benefit of hindsight in evaluating the 
most liberal of the Justice in the data while many of the more conservative justices have either 
recently left or are currently sitting on the bench7. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Epstein, et. al.’s scores are developed using the same measure of economic conservatism as the Poole and 
Rosenthal scores and are thus directly comparable.  Epstein, et. al.’s scores are broken down so that a separate score 
exists for each term that a given justice sat on the Court.  In order to come up with a workable measure of ideology, 
it was necessary to average the scores across each justice’s tenure to obtain one score for each justice.   
7
 The attitude of specific presidents regarding judicial appointments would seem to be an important factor in their 
decision to nominate a high or low quality justice.  To test for this, two approaches were utilized.  First, a random 
effects model was estimated and found that the division of the data into presidential groups account for little or no 
variation in the dependent variable.  Further, a dummy variable was collected coded 1 for Roosevelt, Nixon, and 
Reagan and 0 for all other presidents.  This was designed to capture the distinction between these two groups with 
regard to their situational and attitudinal approaches to judicial selection noted by Goldman (1997).  This method 
too did not yield substantive results. 
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Results and Analysis         
 The results of the regression analysis are expected to mesh with the theory on the impact 
of external political forces on the President during the nomination process.  The expectation is 
that the variable measuring ideological distance between the Senate median and the President 
will have a positive coefficient.  This is to say that as the distance between the Senate and the 
President increases, the quality of the justice will increase.  Also, the variable for presidential 
popularity is expected to have a negative coefficient.  Meaning that the lower the president’s 
popularity, the higher the quality of the justice.  The results of the first model are reported in 
Table 2.   
As evidenced by the results of the first regression model, none of the predictors of 
judicial quality reached an acceptable level of statistical significance.  In fact, the coefficient for 
ideological distance is in the wrong direction.  The coefficient for presidential popularity is in the 
expected direction, indicating a negative relationship with judicial quality.  However, the effect 
observed is minimal and not statistically significant.   
Table 2 
The Effects of Political Circumstances at the Time of Nomination on Judicial Quality 
 
                                      Coefficient          Standard Error    
     
Ideological Distance                  -0.76                     .54  
 
Presidential Popularity      - .0034                  .0093  
 
Length of Service                           .03***                .01  
 
Constant                               2.44***               .713 
 
Adjusted R2 = .25 
N = 32 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
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Finally, the coefficient for length of service is positive and statistically significant at the .01 
level.  This result indicates that for every year that a justice served on the bench, their quality 
score increased by .03.     
 The results of the first model prompt several questions.  First, if ideological difference 
and Presidential popularity do not drive the variation in quality, what does?  If the President’s 
political position and the ideological distance between the President and the Senate do not 
account for variations in quality, there are two likely reasons.  First, and most obvious, is that 
these factors have no relationship with the quality that a given Justice exhibits on the bench.  If 
this is true, the current system of nomination and confirmation, with all its inherent flaws, is 
actually working rather well.  This is in direct contradiction to those who argue that the system is 
broken and needs fixing (Davis 2005).  According to the results of the first model presented 
above, political conflict in the form of ideological difference and intense media and public 
scrutiny during the nomination and confirmation process has not systematically decreased the 
quality of the Justice that is finally confirmed8.  This result is consistent with Comiskey’s (2004) 
finding that while there is variation in quality among individual justices, the overall quality on 
the Court has not experienced any substantial change over time.While this result is normatively 
appealing, the reliability of the data must be considered before making any statements about the 
consistency of judicial quality over time.   
To further investigate the problem with the measure of quality a second model is 
presented that includes a variable to measures judicial ideology.  The results of the second, more 
inclusive model are reported in Table 3.  After controlling for the ideology of the justice, the 
                                                 
8
 One problem with that data is that the quality scores are after the fact assessments of job performance while the 
data collected concerns the time surrounding the nomination.  Epstein & Segal (2005) have collected quality 
rankings based on the perceived qualifications of nominees before their service on the bench.  Substituting these 
quality scores as the dependent variable in the model however does not substantively change the results. 
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results presented in Table 3 show that neither presidential popularity nor ideological distance are 
significant indicators of the quality of the justice that ends up on the bench.  The coefficient for 
service on the Court is again positive and statistically significant.  The results of the second 
model are also interesting in that the variable measuring judicial ideology has a negative 
coefficient9 and is right on the edge of statistical significance at the .05 level.  There are several 
possible explanations for this outcome.  The first is that the quality rankings simply represent a 
liberal bias within the responses to Comiskey’s survey.  Another explanation is that liberal 
justices are simply higher quality justices than their conservative colleagues.  Finally is the fact 
that the composition of the court has changed over the time included in the data.   
 
Table 3 
Effects on Judicial Quality Controlling for Justices’ Ideology 
 
     Coefficient  Standard Error 
       
Ideological Distance   -.60                     .64   
Presidential Popularity  .00082               .0099  
Length of Service   .032**                         .012   
Judicial Ideology   -.44                    .35  
Constant    2.13***             .77 
 
Adjusted R2 = .24 
N = 29 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
 
In the past 30 years the overall ideological make-up of the Court has moved to the right.  For 
example, the three most liberal justices in the data set are Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall; while 
                                                 
9
 The measure of judicial ideology used follows the common-space model developed by Poole and Rosethal and 
measures economic conservatism.  Thus a negative coefficient for this variable can be taken to mean that as 
ideology scores get lower (more liberal), quality increases. 
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the three most conservative are Renquist, Scalia, and Thomas.  One could also argue that the 
most recent appointments of Justices Roberts and Alito provide further evidence of this trend.  
Given that the survey asked respondents to rank past justices, it would be likely that the liberal 
justices of the past would receive higher rankings.  Respondents had the benefit of history’s 
judgment when evaluating these justices, while the most conservative of the group were 
currently still serving on the bench. 
 The results of the two models presented above prompt several questions concerning the 
dependent variable.  Most notably, the influence of both length of service and judicial ideology 
on the quality scores calls into question the reliability of the measure used by Comisky to asses 
the quality of the Court over time.  This only serves to underscore the point made above that the 
quantification of quality poses a difficult obstacle for social science researchers.  Unbiased and 
reliable measures are needed in order to make substantive statements about the value of the 
nomination and confirmation process. 
Conclusion 
 This study seeks to fill a void that exists both in the literature on judicial selection and on 
the historic evaluation of the Court and its members.  Previous studies of quality have taken a 
much more general approach in the assessment of Supreme Court Justices.  This study seeks to 
expand on that work and provide a detailed statistical analysis of the circumstances surrounding 
an appointment to the Supreme Court.  Using a numerical measure of judicial quality as the 
dependent variable allowed for an in-depth look at the impact of several independent variables.  
The results of both models suggest that neither presidential popularity at the time of the 
nomination, nor ideological differences between the President and Senate are factors in the 
quality of the justice that ends up on the bench.  Further, preliminary statistical tests found no 
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support for the notion that presidential attitudes toward judicial selection play an important role 
in determining the quality of a justice.  
 However, the inclusion of controls for both length of service and judicial ideology 
yielded interesting results.  These results call into question the reliability of the measure of 
judicial quality presented in Comiskey’s recent work and suggest that a reliable and unbiased 
measure of judicial quality is still needed to make in depth assessments of both the Court and the 
nomination and confirmation process.  
The Supreme Court holds a unique place in the triumvirate of American government.  It 
is greatly shielded from public view and scrutiny and is presumably not subject to the ever-
changing political landscape in Washington D.C. and around the country.  For many people, the 
televised confirmation hearings and the news that accompany are one of very few glimpses they 
get of a person that holds one of the highest positions in American government.  By focusing on 
the nomination and confirmation process of Supreme Court Justices, political scientists have a 
unique opportunity to produce work that is all at once interesting, important, and relevant to both 
scholars of the Court and those outside the field.  However, in order to make detailed and 
substantive statements about judicial quality and the effectiveness of the nomination and 
confirmation process, a reliable measure of judicial quality is necessary.  This work has shown 
that, with a reliable measure of quality, interesting statements about the effectiveness of the 
process are possible.  What remains is the development of a workable and unbiased measure of 
judicial quality.   
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